We study a market in which both buyers and sellers can decide to preempt and set their quantities before market clearing. Will this lead to preemption on both sides of the market, only one side of the market, or to no preemption at all? We …nd that preemption tends to be asymmetric in the sense that it is restricted to only one side of the market (buyers or sellers).
1 clearing. Each trader outside the competitive fringe is a ‡exible trader and can either precommit to a certain quantity (move early) or refrain from doing so (move late). In the latter case, the trader joins the competitive fringe and acts as a price taker. The assumption that only preempting traders act strategically is not innocuous. It implies that traders who move early consider how their quantity a¤ects the price, while the other traders do not.
We solve the market equilibrium for given numbers of preempting buyers and sellers and analyze then the stable con…gurations of (numbers of) preempting traders. We …nd that an equilibrium in which both buyers and sellers preempt exists only if there is at most one ‡exible trader on each side of the market. In all other cases, the only equilibrium outcome is for all ‡exible traders on one side of the market to precommit and for all traders on the other side of the market to abstain.
The market model
Let S, resp. B, denote the set of sellers, resp. buyers on a homogenous market. 
and individual demand functions
To render the analysis tractable we set = = = 1:
The preemption game
Can a non-empty subgroup of traders on each market side gain by precommitting to what they will trade? We consider a two-stage commitment game with observable delay and two production periods (Hamilton and Slutsky, 1990 The preemption game with observable delay has the following stages:
Stage 0: Flexible sellers and buyers choose the period (period 1 or 2) in which they set their quantities.
Stage 1: Flexible sellers and buyers, who chose period 1, decide about their quantity; others wait. 
Solution of stage 2:
Assume that s S 1 sellers and b B 1 buyers are precommited Let Y (X) be the sum of quantities that the s committed sellers (b committed buyers) have chosen in period 1. In period 2 non-committed players (as well as the two "fringe"traders) choose their quantities competitively such that the market clears. Thus, using (1) and (2) it must hold that
Solution of stage 1:
Anticipating the results of the second stage, a committing seller's and buyer's payo¤ are The individual sales quantity of a non-committed seller is equal to the price p, or
The individual quantity of a non-committed buyer is
The total quantity sold and bought is 
Precommitment in stage 0
With the help of the results above we can derive the equilibrium numbers b and s (with 0 b B 1 and 0 s S 1) of committing buyers and sellers. For an inner equilibrium, that is for 1 s S 2 and 1 b B 2 the following four conditions have to be satis…ed: is an inner solution as de…ned above, note that adding inequalities (3) and (4) as well (5) and (6) yields the conditions B (B 2b) 0 and S (S 2s) 0: Thus, necessary conditions for an inner solution are b B=2 and s S=2: But for these restrictions on s and b it is straightforward that inequalities (4) and (6) cannot be satis…ed. Thus, there is no inner equilibrium. Second, consider the possibility that no ‡exible trader precommits (i.e. s = 0 and b = 0). In this case conditions (4) and (6) have to be satis…ed. They reduce to (B + S + 1) B 2 0 and (B + S + 1) S 2 0:
These conditions are never ful…lled. Hence, there is no equilibrium in which no trader precommits.
Finally, consider the possibility that all ‡exible traders precommit (i.e., s = S 1 and b = B 1):
In this case conditions (3) and (5) have to be satis…ed. They reduce to 2 B 2 2B 1 0 and 2 S 2 2S 1 0 for the committed sellers and buyers respectively. These conditions will be satis…ed simultaneously if and only if S 2 and B 2:
The Proposition states that if S 3 or B 3 then all ‡exible traders on one side of the market precommit while no trader on the other side of the market precommits. Traders who preempt set lower quantities than those who do not preempt. Preempting sellers raise the price; preempting buyers lower the price. The marginal bene…t of an e¤ectuated price change decreases with the quantity traded, however. If many traders on the other side of the market preempt the equilibrium quantity is low which discourages attempts to change the price by the other side of the market. Thus, preemption on one market side causes the other side to abstain (and vice versa).
Conclusion
We analyze endogenous preemption on both sides of a market and show that preemption tends to be restricted to one side of the market. Either the buyers or the sellers preempt, but not both sides of the markets at the same time. Also it is not an equilibrium for no trader to preempt.
To simplify matters we relied on a symmetric model with quadratic utility and cost functions. More crucial is our assumption that traders who do not preempt join the competitive fringe.
This suggests an alternative interpretation of our model as one that endogenizes the number of strategic traders in a market. It could be interesting to analyze how results change when ‡exible traders, who do not preempt, act strategically rather than competitively.
Hence, no seller and all ‡exible buyers committing is an equilibrium i¤ B 3: The second inequality is never ful…lled. Hence, there is no such equilibrium.
No ‡exible seller and some buyers precommit (i.e., s = 0; b 1): In this case conditions (4), (5) and (6) there is no such equilibrium.
All ‡exible sellers and some ‡exible buyers precommit (i.e., s = S 1; b 1): In this case
